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Inclusion: A New Addition to Remedy a History of 
Inadequate Conditions and Terms 
Kathryn E. Crossley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act in 1975, requiring that children with disabilities be educated in 
the “least restrictive environment.”1 Now entitled the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),2 the statute’s least restrictive 
environment provision directs states to establish procedures for 
placing disabled children in a general education classroom setting.3 
Additionally, it requires schools to provide supplementary aids and 
services to accommodate the various disabilities.4 Schools may use 
special classrooms and facilities only when disabled students cannot 
achieve satisfactory progress in a general educational environment.5 
Courts typically refer to the IDEA’s policy of placing disabled 
children in the least restrictive environment as either “inclusion” or 
“mainstreaming.”6 However, the terms are not interchangeable. 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2000. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 
§§ 1400-1491 (1994)). 
 3. The Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975 was passed in response to a serious 
concern that children with disabilities were being denied the opportunity for public education. 
20 U.S.C. § 1400(C)(3). Thus, Congress passed the Act, requiring states to demonstrate that 
they have created a policy assuring every disabled child a right to free and appropriate 
education in order to receive financial assistance from the federal government. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(1).  
 4. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). These provisions apply to individuals in institutions or other 
care facilities as well as to individuals in public schools and public facilities. Id. 
 5. Id. The least restrictive environment provision plays an important role in decisions 
regarding free and appropriate public education for all students with disabilities. See infra Part 
II.B. 
 6. The IDEA requires that children with disabilities be educated with children who are 
not disabled and that this requirement be met “to the maximum extent appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(5)(B). This requirement by the IDEA initially resulted in a movement toward 
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Mainstreaming is the practice of placing disabled students into 
general educational classrooms with the appropriate supplemental 
support.7 On the other hand, inclusion is the practice of simply 
integrating disabled children with children who are not disabled.8 
Under the IDEA, inclusion first appeared educationally 
motivated.9 However, the recent federal courts’ trend is toward the 
placement of all children with disabilities into general education 
classrooms, regardless of the educational benefit received.10 This 
 
mainstreaming. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d sub 
nom ., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the 
mainstreaming process, children primarily are placed in special education classrooms, but they 
are also placed into a general classroom for part of the day. Id. Now, however, the 
mainstreaming concept has evolved into a concept referred to as “inclusion.” See Anne Profit 
Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against “Inclusion,” 72 WASH. L. REV. 
775, 779 n.16 (1997) (citing Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 971 n.7 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(noting that there is a preference in the educational environment to use the term “inclusion”)). 
Under inclusion, children with disabilities are placed in a general educational environment for 
the entire day.  
 7. The IDEA does not require mainstreaming in all cases; the IDEA simply requires that 
students be educated in the least restrictive environment. Thus, removal from the general 
classroom may be allowed only if it is absolutely necessary. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). 
 8. “Inclusion” is a term of art  that is not mentioned in the IDEA. Inclusion generally 
refers to a situation where the home base of the disabled child is the general educational 
classroom. The disabled student either receives special education in that classroom or the 
student is removed for a short period of time into a special classroom. 
 9. Before the enactment of the IDEA, disabled children were excluded from the general 
educational setting. The IDEA represents a federal effort to promote the education of children 
with disabilities and was passed as a result of Congress’ apprehension that most children with 
disabilities “were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular 
classrooms awaiting the time when they were old enough to ‘drop out.’” Bd. of Educ. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975)).  
 10. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Is the Era of Judicially-Ordered Inclusion Over? , 114 
EDUC. LAW REP. 1011, 1012 (1997). 
Beginning in 1989 federal appeals courts in several circuits started to order placements 
in inclusionary settings for students with fairly severe disabilities. These opinions 
indicated that an inclusionary placement should be the placement of choice and that a 
student with disabilities should be excluded from the regular educational environment 
only in the face of strong evidence that exclusion was required.  
Id. See also  Robert L. Hughes & Michael A. Rebell, Special Educational Inclusion and the 
Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523, 524 (1996) (citing 
MARY ELLEN GUZMAN,  SUCCESS FOR EACH CHILD:  A RESEARCH -BASED REPORT ON 
ELIMINATING T RACKING ON NEW YORK CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS 42 (1992)). Since the IDEA’s 
enactment, the trend has been toward least restrictive environment placements. Id. Before the 
IDEA, nearly 70% of all children with disabilities were educated in a separate classroom or 
building. Id. Today, 34.9% of disabled children are educated in general classrooms, 36.3% in 
part -time programs, 23.5% in separate classrooms housed in regular school buildings, 3.9% in 
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process of inclusion can be difficult for both disabled children and 
children without disabilities. Some disabled children might not fare 
well in an environment not specifically tailored to meet their needs. 
Furthermore, the disabled children’s struggle to adapt often impedes 
the education of children without disabilities in the classroom. 
Unfortunately, courts have concentrated on the appearance of 
inclusion instead of on the actual benefits received. 
Part II of this Recent Development focuses on the history behind 
the call for inclusion of disabled children into a general educational 
environment and IDEA’s consequential enactment. Part III discusses 
and analyzes the tests circuit courts use in determining when a 
disabled child should be mainstreamed into the general classroom. 
Furthermore, Part III reveals the courts’ trend toward inclusion 
despite the negative effects inclusion often has on all involved 
parties. 
After analyzing the various court decisions regarding inclusion, 
Part IV of this Recent Development proposes a clear test which will 
mainstream only those disabled children most likely to benefit 
academically from mainstreaming. Additionally, this proposed test 
ensures that inclusion enriches the children without disabilities as 
well as the children with disabilities. 
II. THE HISTORY OF INCLUSION 
A. The Movement from Exclusion to Inclusion 
Prior to 1975 the public and the government were not concerned 
with the education of children with special needs.11 Children with 
 
separate schools, 0.9% in residential facilities, and 0.5% in homebound or hospital programs. 
Id. 
 11. See LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The Effects 
of Judicial Determinations of the Individual with Disabilities Education Act on Disabled and 
Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 860 (1998) (citing STEPHEN B. THOMAS & 
CHARLES J. RUSSO , SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: ISSUES & IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ’90S 3 
(1995)). Access to public education was not a matter of serious concern: “Laws were enacted 
that restricted the rights of individuals with disabilities to immigrate, to vote, to obtain a 
driver’s license, to purchase a hunting or fishing license, to hold office, and in the case of 
newborn infants, to live.” Id. at 860 n.35 (quoting T HOMAS & RUSSO , supra , at 2). 
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disabilities virtually were excluded from the first schools.12 Instead, 
families educated their disabled children themselves because, 
traditionally, it was considered more convenient to exclude disabled 
children from the regular educational setting.13 In 1893 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court reinforced those beliefs by upholding 
the exclusion of a mentally retarded child from the public school 
system.14 Moreover, in 1919 the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended 
the exclusion of disabled students to a child suffering from a 
particular type of paralysis.15 Thus, society channeled those children 
who did not fit its impression of the “normal” child into special 
educational settings.  
The number of special education classrooms increased at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.16 The increase coincided with the 
movement toward compulsory education and the large number of 
children immigrating to the United States.17 Enrollment in public 
school systems grew drastically and altered the organization of 
schools.18 School systems developed formal procedures in which 
students advanced from one grade to the next on the basis of age or 
academic achievement.19 Mentally deficient children or those who 
required special attention did not fit in this system; thus, these 
 
 12. Id. at 864 (quoting BONNIE POITEAS T UCKER, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW § 14.1 
(West 1974)). 
 13. Id. at 860 n.34 (citing ALLAN G. OSBORNE,  JR. ,  LEGAL ISSUES IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 1 (1996)). 
 14. Watson v. City of Cambridge, 32 N.E. 864, 864 (Mass. 1893) (affirming a school 
committee’s determination that a mentally retarded child could not benefit from the public 
school system because the school committee was in charge of the school).  
 15. State ex rel Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1919). The child suffered 
from paralysis of the limbs and of the vocal cords and often drooled as a result. Id. at 154. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the boy’s interest in receiving a public school 
education “cannot be insisted upon when [the boy’s] presence therein is harmful to the best 
interests of the school.” Id. 
 16. See Dupre, supra  note 6, at 784 (citing CAROLE MURRAY-SEEGERT, NASTY GIRLS, 
T HUGS, AND HUMANS LIKE US 17 (1989)). Beginning in the 1950s, advances in medical 
technology enabled more children with disabilities to survive early childhood. Id. Thus, the 
need for services for the disabled also increased. Id. 
 17. See Hughes & Rebell, supra  note 10, at 529 (citing SEYMOUR B. SARISON & JOHN 
DORIS, EDUCATIONAL HANDICAP, PUBLIC POLICY , AND SOCIAL HISTORY 138 (1979)). A 1921 
survey indicated that 75% of special education students in New York City had foreign born 
parents. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
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children were removed from general classrooms and funneled into 
“special” classrooms.20 
Eventually, the sheer number of students with special needs 
required schools to create more special education programs.21 As a 
result of the growing number of programs, schools began to receive 
federal financial assistance to aid in the training and education of the 
children with special needs.22 Parents of disabled children pushed for 
even more programs23 and set up organizations such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Retarded Citizens and the 
Association for Children with Learning Disabilities.24 By the 1970s 
approximately eight million children in the United States received 
some form of special education, primarily through separate 
educational facilities.25 
As special education programs increased, a stigma attached to 
students placed in special educational settings.26 Thus, educators 
conducted various experiments to determine if disabled children 
could be placed in a regular educational environment.27 These 
experiments proved to be relatively successful, sparking a movement 
toward the inclusion of children with disabilities into general 
classrooms.28 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
bolstered the movement toward inclusion.29 In Brown the Court held 
that racially segregating students of color results in inherently 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Hughes & Rebell, supra  note 10, at 531 (citing Maynard C. Reynolds & Sylvia 
W. Rosen, Special Education: Past, Present, and Future, EDUC. FORUM, May 1976, reprinted 
in SPECIAL LEARNING CORPORATION, READINGS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 4, 6 (1980)).  
 22. Id. (citing Paul Irvine, History of Special Education, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPECIAL 
EDUCATION 785, 788 (Cecil R. Reynolds & Lester Mann eds., 1987)). 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Hughes & Rebell, supra  note 10, at 531. 
 27. Id. at 532. Even in the early days of special education, educators expressed concern 
about educating disabled children in separate environments. Id. These educators believed that it 
might be more beneficial to educate disabled children with non-disabled peers. Id. 
 28. Id. (citing G.G. Newman, The Assessment of Programs in the Treatment of Hyper-
aggressive Children with Learning Disabilities within the School Setting, 29 AMER. J. OF 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 633 (1959)). Several reports of successful mainstreaming of autistic, 
mentally retarded, or cerebrally ill children appeared in educational literature. Id. 
 29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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unequal education and is therefore unconstitutional.30 Proponents of 
inclusion analogized that the use of separate facilities for students 
with disabilities was similarly unequal.31 
In the early 1970s inclusion began to take shape in the courts with 
the case of Pennsylvania  Association for Retarded Children (PARC) 
v. Pennsylvania .32 In PARC, the district court ordered a school to 
place a mentally retarded child in a general educational setting.33 The 
district court explained that segregating the child violated the child’s 
due process and equal protection rights.34 Similarly, in Mills v. Board 
of Education, the D.C. district court held that a school’s actions 
violated the due process rights of disabled children.35 
Congress addressed the inclusion issue in 1975 by enacting the 
Education for All Handicapped Children’s Act.36 Congress’ goal 
 
 30. Id. at 495. 
 31. See Hughes & Rebell, supra  note 10, at 532-33 (citing Note, Enforcing the Right to an 
Appropriate Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 1103, 1107 (1979)). Mainstreaming proponents argued that segregated schools for 
children with disabilities were unequal because they provided “substandard and inadequate” 
educational resources. Id. See also  Dupre, supra  note 6, at 784 (citing MURRAY-SEEGERT, 
supra  note 6, at 17). Advocates for disabled children argued that the disabled children were a 
minority like certain racial groups and launched civil rights attacks, following the lead of 
advocates for racial minority groups. Id. 
 32. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). An advocate for disabled children brought a class 
action suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on behalf of mentally retarded children 
who were being placed in separate classrooms. Id. at 1259. The court issued a consent order 
which required Pennsylvania to provide free and appropriate public education, with the 
presumption that the general classroom setting is preferable to a special education environment. 
Id. at 1260. 
 33. Id. at 1258. 
 34. Id. at 1259. The PARC decision is considered to be the first “right to education” case 
involving disabled children. 
 35. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). In addition to its application to retarded children, the 
holding applied to other “exceptional” children, such as children with behavioral problems and 
emotionally disturbed or hyperactive children. Id. at 866. The court stated that no child should 
be excluded from a public school unless that child is provided with “adequate alternative 
educational services suited to the child’s needs . . . with a constitutionally adequate prior 
hearing.” Id. at 878. 
 36. See supra  note 1 and accompanying text. The IDEA addresses both the substantive 
and procedural rights of disabled children. Id. First, parents of disabled children may sue in 
state or federal court if their child is not placed in a general classroom for the entire day. 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1994). Second, there is a substantive requirement that in order to qualify 
for financial assistance from the federal government states must show they have a policy which 
ensures all children, disabled or not, a free and appropriate public education. § 1412(1). 
Additionally, the state is required to provide the disabled child with a “full educational 
opportunity.” § 1412(s)(A). Thus, the IDEA mandates that schools develop Individual 
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behind the IDEA is to provide disabled children with a free and 
appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment that 
meets their needs.37 Specifically, disabled children should be 
educated, to the “maximum extent appropriate,” with children who 
are not disabled.38 To achieve this goal, Congress allocates federal 
funding to the states.39 In return, the states must comply with the 
procedural requirements set forth in the IDEA.40 In part, the IDEA 
requires that schools designate a group of individuals to establish an 
Individualized Educational Plan (IEP)41 for each disabled child.  
B. The Trend of the Courts 
To date, the courts have not provided a clear test to determine 
when it is appropriate to mainstream children with disabilities into a 
general classroom environment. The courts’ decisions, however, 
 
Education Programs for disabled children. § 1414(d). The school must notify the parents of a 
disabled child if the school plans to change or modify the child’s IEP. § 1415(b)(1)(c). The 
parent then can argue against the proposed changes and, if the situation is not resolved to the 
satisfaction of the parents, the parents are entitled to a due process hearing on the matter. 
§ 1415(b)(2). The parents may appeal the decision to a state agency and again to a state or 
federal district court. § 1415(e)(2). 
 37. § 1401(a)(18). The free and appropriate public education requirement includes: (1) 
special education for the disabled child at no cost to the child’s parents; (2) other support 
services “as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special 
education.” Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See supra  note 3. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). The IEP is developed in a meeting which includes the teacher of 
the disabled student, a representative of the agency that supervises the child’s special education, 
the child’s parents, and possibly the child. Id. A written IEP is developed annually. Id. 
Requirements of each IEP include: 
(A) a statement of the disabled child’s present levels of performance; (B) a statement 
of short -term objectives and measurable annual goals; (C) a statement of the 
educational services to be provided to the child; (D) and the extent of participation the 
child will have in the regular educational environment; (E) a statement of the 
transitional services the student will need beginning at an age no later than sixteen, and 
when appropriate, fourteen; (F) the projected date of the services to be provided to 
such student; (G) appropriate procedures for determining whether the various 
objectives set forth are being achieved, and in the case that the administrative agency 
fails to provide the services agrees upon, a new committee shall come together to form 
a new IEP for the disabled child.  
Id. 
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appear to emphasize the non-academic benefits disabled children 
receive when they are mainstreamed into general settings. 
In 1982 the Supreme Court announced a two-part standard for 
reviewing state compliance under the IDEA in Board of Education v. 
Rowley.42 First, the court determines whether the state has complied 
with the procedural requirements of the IDEA.43 Second, the court 
determines whether the IEP is sufficient to enable the disabled child 
to receive educational benefits.44 If the state has satisfied both of 
these requirements, then the state has complied with the IDEA. The 
Court did not address the issue of mainstreaming, but instead focused 
on the role courts should play in the mainstreaming process.45 
 
 42. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). In Rowley, the parents of an eight-year-old deaf child requested 
a due process hearing after their request for an interpreter was denied. Id. at 184. The child 
originally was placed in a regular kindergarten classroom and was provided with a hearing aid. 
Id. The child successfully completed kindergarten; however, her parents still felt that their child 
should be provided with a sign language interpreter for her first grade class. Id. The school 
district provided an interpreter for the child for two weeks during her kindergarten year, but the 
interpreter and the school district both agreed that the service provided was not necessary. Id. 
The case went to trial, and the Supreme Court determined that the IDEA did not require the 
states to maximize the potential of a disabled child. Id. at 198. The Court explained that a state 
has met the IDEA’s requirements once it provides the disabled child with a free and appropriate 
public education and “personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the 
child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Id. at 203. Thus, the Court reaffirmed the 
Rowley dictate that courts leave educational policy to the schools. The Court declined to review 
whether the school had developed adequate placements for the disabled child as required by the 
IDEA. Id. at 202. The court stated that this type of educational decision went far beyond its 
scope. Id. See also  Lachman v. State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988); A.W. v. 
Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 164 (8th Cir. 1987). The Lachman court explained that 
the district court “correctly ascertained that Rowley is the definitive Supreme Court 
pronouncement to date as to the standard a school district must meet in order to satisfy its 
U.S.C. § 1412(1) obligation to provide all handicapped children with a free and appropriate 
public education.” Lachman, 852 F.2d at 293. 
 43. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. 
 44. Id. at 206-07. The Supreme Court explained that, although the reviewing court should 
make its determination based on a preponderance of the evidence, the courts must also defer to 
state administrative proceedings and refrain from substituting “their own notions of sound 
educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Id. at 206. “The 
primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and 
for choosing the method most suitable to the child’s needs, was left by the Act to state and local 
agencies. . . .” Id. at 207. 
 45. The IDEA’s mainstreaming requirement provides that: 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are educated with 
children who are not disabled and that special classes, separate schooling, or other 
removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs 
only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular 
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Rowley’s deferential standard of review shifted the focus of states’ 
mainstreaming programs away from the IDEA’s requirements and 
toward a new set of standards created by state courts.46 
In Roncker v. Walter47 the Sixth Circuit set forth its test for 
mainstreaming children with disabilities.48 The court reviewed the 
district court’s decision to place a severely retarded nine-year-old in a 
special school.49 The Roncker court declined to apply the Rowley test 
 
classes with the use of supplemental aids and services cannot be achieved 
satisfactorily. . . .” 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).  
 46. After the Supreme Court set a deferential standard of review regarding state and local 
actions involving education in Rowley, several courts created different standards of 
mainstreaming review. These standards ended up decreasing the deference Rowley had given to 
the states while increasing the role of the courts in inclusion cases.  
 47. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983). The mother of a nine-year-old mentally retarded child 
challenged her son’s placement in a special school for the mentally retarded. Id. at 1060-61. 
 48. See also  Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 877 (4th Cir. 1989). The 
parents of a seventeen-year-old autistic child wanted the child placed in a high school near their 
home. The court quoted Roncker with approval and held that the disabled student was 
appropriately placed by the school in a segregated program because the student would not 
receive an appropriate education in the mainstream facility even with the use of supplemental 
aids and services. Id. at 879-80. See also  Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989). 
An IEP committee proposed that a disabled child who suffered from a moderate hearing 
impairment and speech problems be placed in a special pre-school class which was contained in 
a regular educational building. Id. at 689. The committee believed that because of the child’s 
educational difficulties the child’s best interest would not be served in a general educational 
environment. Id. at 690. However, the parents of the disabled child believed that the child 
should have more interaction with non-disabled children and requested a due process hearing. 
Id. The hearing officer determined that the IEP was appropriate and the child’s parents filed a 
lawsuit. Id. at 690-91. The federal district court applied the Roncker test and reversed the 
decision of the officer at the due process hearing. Id. at 690. The court stated that the child 
“could feasibly have been offered services in a much less segregated setting.” Id. at 692. The 
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and explained that the district court should 
not have substituted its own judgment for that of the school district. Id. at 693. The court 
explained that experts already had reached a decision on what would be in the best interest of 
the child, and this decision was appropriate and guided by individuals familiar with the 
situation. Id.  
 49. Rockner, 700 F.2d at 1061. The district court determined that the school district had 
broad discretion in determining the placement of a child with a disability. Id. The court 
explained that the school district had not abused its discretion because the child required 
constant supervision, had a mental age of two or three, and had made no significant progress in 
the integrated environment. Id. at 1060-61. According to the court, the child “was not 
progressing in his present placement but was regressing. His ability to interact with the non-
handicapped children was at best minimal. His opportunity to interact with non-handicapped 
children was also very minimal.” Id. at 1064 (Kennedy J., dissenting). Relying on expert 
testimony, the court determined that the child would be better served by a segregated placement 
because the child was not progressing in the integrated environment. Id. at 1061. 
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because the court believed that the application of Rowley’s standards 
is limited to cases which involve a controversy regarding the 
appropriate methods for educating a disabled child.50 In contrast, 
Roncker involved the adequacy of the mainstreaming process itself.51 
Thus, the Roncker court established its own test for determining 
when to mainstream disabled children.52 The court explained that 
even in cases where a segregated setting seems superior to meet 
disabled children’s needs, the school district still should determine 
whether the same benefits could be achieved in a non-segregated 
setting.53 The court held that the benefits of both settings then should 
be compared, along with the costs incurred in placing the disabled 
child in a general educational environment.54 
In 1989,55 in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education,56 the Fifth 
Circuit similarly refused to follow the Rowley test and formulated its 
 
 50. Rockner, 700 F.2d at 1061. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. After setting forth a new test for mainstreaming, the Roncker court remanded the 
case back to the district court to determine whether the child could be placed in a more 
mainstreamed setting. Id. 
 55. See Osborne, supra  note 10, at 1012. Beginning in 1989 federal courts in many 
circuits began to order mainstreaming for children with disabilities. Id. The courts explained 
that mainstreaming should be the preferred choice of action and that a disabled student should 
be excluded from the regular educational environment only if there is strong evidence that the 
exclusion was necessary. Id. at 1018. Prior to 1989, however, litigation focused more on the 
educational aspect of inclusion. Id. at 1016. The least restrictive environment mandate of the 
IDEA appeared to be second to an appropriate education. Thus the courts ordered school 
districts to mainstream disabled children only when the courts were faced with evidence that the 
disabled child could be appropriately educated in the less restrictive environment and the 
benefits of the least restrictive environment outweighed the negative effects. Id. See also St. 
Louis Developmental Disabilities Ctr. v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416 (W.D. Mo. 1986); 
Matthews v. Campbell, 551 EHLR 264 (E.D. Va 1979). However, courts would approve 
placements in cases where an appropriate program was not available at the public schools.  
 56. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989). At his parent’s request, the school placed a six-year-
old boy with Down’s syndrome in a general kindergarten class for half of the day, and in a 
special education environment for the remainder of the day. Id. at 1039. The boy’s capacity 
seemed to be no more than a child of two or three years, and his teacher reported that he could 
not comprehend any of the skills she tried to teach him. Id. Additionally, the teacher noted that 
her method of teaching would have to be substantially modified in order to reach the boy. Id. 
Consequently, the school recommended that the boy be placed in a special educational 
environment except during lunch and recess. Id. The boy’s parents sued the school to force 
them to include their son in a general class. Id. at 1040. 
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own mainstreaming test.57 The court affirmed the district court’s 
decision to place a child with Down’s syndrome in a special 
educational setting.58 The court then articulated a two-part test for 
ordering inclusive placements.59 The court stated that a school district 
first must determine whether or not a disabled child can be educated 
in the general classroom with the appropriate aids and services.60 If 
not, the court examines whether the school mainstreamed the 
disabled child to the maximum extent possible.61 The court noted that 
the application of this test does not contemplate that the school will 
provide every supplement and aid conceivable. In addition, the court 
must consider the effect the disabled child has on the other children 
in the general classroom.62 The Daniel R.R. court emphasized the 
social benefits the disabled child might receive from placement in a 
general educational environment and explained that these benefits 
outweigh the possible academic benefits.63 
In Greer v. Rome City School District,64 the Eleventh Circuit 
 
 57. The court felt that the Rowley test was inapplicable to mainstreaming and developed 
its own mainstreaming standard. 874 F.2d at 1045-50. T he Daniel R.R. court apparently based 
this decision on the Eighth Circuit’s statement that the “Rowley test assumes that the state has 
met all of the requirements of the Act, including the mainstreaming requirement.” Id. at 1045. 
In Daniel R.R., the court noted that although the district court does not answer the second part 
of the Rowley test, the district court’s determination that the segregated school provided an 
appropriate education incorporated the Rowley standard. Id. The Fifth Circuit explained that 
because Rowley did not directly address mainstreaming, the district court properly looked to 
Roncker for guidance. Id. at 1045-46. 
 58. Id. at 1052. 
 59. Id. at 1042. 
 60. 874 F.2d at 1048. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1048-49. After applying the test, the court concluded that the school board had 
integrated the boy to the maximum extent appropriate by allowing him to interact with non-
disabled children during lunch and recess. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1047. The Daniel R.R. court explained that the child could learn from the 
disabled children’s conduct, and thus the actual benefit received was of lesser importance. Id. 
The educational achievement was not as important as the social benefits the disabled child 
could receive. Id. The court stated that the “academic achievement is not the only purpose of 
mainstreaming.” Id. at 1049. Thus, the court focused on the “overall growth and developmental 
benefits gained from education.” Id. at 1047 n.8. The court cited Roncker and explained that a 
disabled child may benefit from the “language models that his nonhandicapped peers provide 
for him.” Id. at 1049. The possible social benefit “may tip the balance in favor of 
mainstreaming,” even absent a clear educational benefit to the disabled child. Id.  
 64. 950 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1991). The school district proposed an IEP for a child with 
Down’s syndrome which recommended a self-contained classroom because the child required 
more attention than the other children. Id. at 690-91. Additionally, the school psychologist 
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adopted and enlarged the test set out in Daniel R.R.65 The Greer court 
explained that in order to determine whether a special classroom or a 
general classroom would be more appropriate for a child with a 
disability, the court should compare the educational benefits of 
each.66 The court also noted that the cost of placing a disabled child 
in a general educational environment should be considered.67 
Applying this test, the court concluded that a nine-year-old student 
with Down’s syndrome should be mainstreamed into a general 
kindergarten class.68 The court reasoned that the student had 
progressed in the general classroom and that she did not disrupt other 
children.69 
The Third Circuit built on the mainstreaming requirements of the 
aforementioned cases in Oberti v. Board of Education of the Borough 
of Clementon School District.70 The court held that school districts 
 
explained that the child would benefit more from a specialized environment because the child 
had learning and communication disabilities that required special attention. Id. at 691. 
 65. The Eleventh Circuit adopted the Daniel R.R. test and held that the Rowley test is 
inapplicable to mainstreaming cases. Id. at 696. The court used a modified Daniel R.R. test and 
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the school had failed to consider whether the child 
could be mainstreamed into a general environment with the use of supplemental aids and 
services. Id. at 699. The court held that the district court did not meet the first prong of the 
Daniel R.R. test. Id. 
 66. 950 F.2d at 695-99. 
 67. Id. at 697. 
 68. Id. at 698. The court determined that the school had not complied fully with the IDEA 
because the school had not considered supplemental aids and services that it could have used to 
accommodate the child to help mainstream the child into the general classroom. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993). Rafael Oberti was a child with Down’s syndrome 
whose intellectual capacity placed him among the lowest 1% of the population for intellectual 
capacity. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Clementon Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 
n.1 (D.N.J. 1992). At the time of the appeal, Rafael was eight years old. 995 F.2d 1204, 1207. 
When Rafael reached kindergarten age, the school district recommended that he be placed in a 
special educational environment. Id. Rafael’s parents objected to this placement and reached an 
agreement with the district where Rafael spent the morning in a developmental kindergarten 
classroom and the afternoon in a special education class. Id. Soon it became clear that Rafael 
needed additional aids and services, and the school hired a teaching aide. Id. at 1208. Neither 
party denied that Rafael had a history of serious behavioral problems, which included toileting 
accidents, hitting and spitting on other children, and temper tantrums. Id. The teacher’s aide did 
little to alleviate Rafael’s problems and Rafael’s behavior disrupted both classrooms. Id. The 
school district proposed that Rafael attend a special class for the “educable mentally retarded,” 
located in a different school district. Id. Rafael’s parents objected again, and the school district 
gave Rafael another opportunity to be educated with other disabled children. Id. Although 
Rafael’s behavior improved, the school district had no intentions of returning Rafael to his 
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have an affirmative obligation to consider the placement of disabled 
children into a general educational environment before the school 
district explores alternative placements.71 The court stated that 
compliance with the goals of the IDEA required the district to 
maximize inclusion opportunities.72 The district must provide 
supplements, aids, and services which sufficiently modify the general 
classroom into a classroom that can accommodate disabled 
children.73 This presumption in favor of inclusion should be 
disregarded only if the disabled child will receive little or no benefit 
from mainstreaming or if the disabled child is so disruptive as to 
render it nearly impossible for the other children to conduct their 
studies.74 Applying these principles, the court found that a segregated 
special education class was not the least restrictive environment for a 
child with Down’s syndrome.75 
In 1994, in Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H., 
the Ninth Circuit echoed the trend toward “full inclusion.”76 The 
 
original school for further mainstreaming opportunities. When Rafael’s parents discovered this, 
they brought a due process complaint under the IDEA. Id. at 1209. 
 71. 995 F.2d at 1217-18. 
 72. Id. at 1216. The court explained that a school must consider the full range of 
supplemental aids and services appropriate to the child’s disabilities, including speech and 
language therapy, special education training for the general classroom teachers, and behavior 
modification classes. Id. The court reasoned that a child might be disruptive simply because 
adequate aids and services were not provided for him. Id. at 1217. The court also noted that a 
school should try to “modify the regular educational program to accommodate a disabled 
child.” Id. at 1216. 
 73. Id. at 1216. 
 74. 995 F.2d at 1217. 
 75. Id. at 1218. See also  Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992) 
(holding that a disabled child should be educated in a general classroom even if a separate 
educational facility would be academically superior). 
 76. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). The court found that a mentally retarded eleven-year-old 
child should be educated full-time in a general classroom. Id. The court of appeals adopted a 
four-factor test promulgated by the district court that incorporated the factors found in the 
Roncker and Daniel R.R. cases. Id. The four factors are: (1) the educational benefits of full-time 
placement in a regular educational environment; (2) the nonacademic benefits of such 
placement; (3) the effect of such placement on the teacher and students in the regular 
educational environment; and (4) the cost of such placement. Id. at 1404. The court of appeals 
upheld the district court’s reasoning that a child with a disability should be educated in a regular 
educational environment even if a special education placement would be academically superior 
and the general classroom is not the best academic setting for the child. See Bd. of Educ. v. 
Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d sub nom ., Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. 
v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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court emphasized the IDEA’s requirement that a child with a 
disability should be placed in a special classroom only if that child 
could not satisfactorily progress in a general educational 
environment.77 
In Hartmann v. Loudoun County Board of Education78 the Fourth 
Circuit also followed the principles delineated in the aforementioned 
cases. In Hartmann, the court held that a general classroom was not 
appropriate for an autistic child who was unable to speak or write and 
who was violent and disruptive in class.79 The court explained that 
although the school district had done everything reasonable to 
mainstream the autistic child into the general classroom, the child 
received no benefits from these efforts.80 The court concluded that the 
IDEA’s presumption toward inclusion served no purpose in this 
case.81 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF INCLUSION CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 
A. The Trend 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the inclusion issue. Circuit 
courts struggle to formulate a clear test to determine when the 
placement of a disabled child into a general educational environment 
is appropriate.82 The recent trend in the federal courts is toward 
 
 77. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1403 (citing 20 U.S.C.  § 1412(5)(B)). 
 78. 118 F.3d 996 (4th Cir. 1997). The court examined an eleven-year-old autistic child 
who was unable to speak and had severe problems with his motor coordination skills. Id. at 999. 
The school placed the child in a general educational environment with a special aide and 
various support services. Id. To further accommodate the child, teachers were educated about 
autistic children and how to deal with them. Id. In addition, a special education teacher was 
assigned to the child to aid him with his curriculum. Id. Despite these efforts the child proved 
unable to cope in a general classroom. Id. The child disrupted the classroom and often engaged 
in hitting, biting, kicking, and removing his clothes. Id. The school finally decided to place the 
child in a separate educational facility. Id. at 1000. 
 79. Id. at 997. 
 80. Id. at 1005 
 81. Id.  
 82. See Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 932 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a 
school may depart from Congress’ preference for mainstreaming if the school provides 
sufficient evidence that the disabled student would not benefit from mainstreaming and that 
benefits received in a segregated setting would be superior to those received in an integrated 
environment); Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the least restrictive environment mandate does not mean that the school has an absolute duty to 
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mainstreaming the majority of disabled children.83 The courts’ focus 
does not appear to be on the educational benefits of inclusion, but on 
the non-academic purposes mainstreaming might serve.84 
Many of the circuits hold that a presumption toward inclusion 
should apply to a disabled child wishing to enroll in a general 
classroom.85 The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
circuits generally agree that mainstreaming should be the solution 
whenever it is appropriate.86 However, the circuits differ on the 
meaning of the word “appropriate.” Some circuits interpret the word 
so broadly that mainstreaming is appropriate in nearly all cases in 
which a disabled child wishes to enter a general classroom.87 Other 
circuits narrowly focus on whether the child can benefit socially.88 
B. Strengths of Inclusion 
Inclusion is the logical choice when a child’s disabilities are so 
minimal that exclusion would be detrimental to his or her social and 
 
place the child in the school the student prefers to attend); Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 
882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989); Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of State of Conn., 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 
1989); Liscio v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., 734 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that 
free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment requires that a 
handicapped student be placed in classes for the mentally retarded for academic subjects, but 
mainstreamed with non-handicapped peers for nonacademic subjects); Thornock v. Boise 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 767 P.2d 1241 (Idaho 1988) (holding that the school district had not 
provided a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment when it 
failed to prepare an adequate IEP containing goals, objectives, and a statement of the possibility 
of mainstreaming).  
 83. See Martha M. McCarthy, Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is it Required?, 95 
EDUC. LAW REP. 823, 830 (1995). “The judiciary is interpreting the IDEA as favoring 
inclusion, and courts seem less inclined to uphold segregated placements. If the school district 
has not taken steps to educate a child with disabilities in the regular classroom with appropriate 
support, an IDEA violation will likely be found.” Id. The Daniel R.R. court, however, explains 
that courts still will examine each case on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
 84. The Oberti court stated that “a fundamental value of the right to public education for 
children with disabilities is the right to associate with nondisabled peers.” 995 F.2d 1204, 1216-
17 (3d Cir. 1993). Other post -Rowley cases indicate that the courts are more concerned with 
improved socialization skills than with improved educational abilities. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 
874 F.2d 1036, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 85. McCarthy, supra  note 83, at 826-27. 
 86. Id. at 826-30. 
 87. See, e.g., Oberti, 995 F.2d 1204. 
 88. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d 1036. 
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educational growth.89 Exclusion can stigmatize such a child because 
it can cause the child to view a disability as an implication that they 
are inferior to other children.90 Including this type of child into a 
general educational environment could improve the child’s self-
esteem, and proponents of inclusion contend that this, in turn, could 
contribute to greater academic success.91 
Advocates for inclusion also argue that mainstreaming a disabled 
child into a general classroom can help the disabled child cope with 
disability.92 The disabled child may use the other children as role 
models and eventually come to realize that everyone is different in 
one way or another. As a result, the disabled child would not feel 
inferior but would feel like every other child.  
C. Weaknesses of Inclusion 
While mainstreaming can be a benefit to some disabled children, 
this is not always the case.93 Not all disabled children flourish in a 
general educational environment. Some disabilities are so severe that 
placement in a general classroom actually can hinder the child’s 
growth.94 These children are served better in a separate facility which 
is specifically equipped to accommodate the child’s disability. 
Advocates of inclusion argue that academic benefits should not be 
the only consideration; the social benefits that a child with a 
disability can achieve from placement in a general education 
 
 89. Boeckman, supra  note 11, at 873. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047-48. 
 93. See McCarthy, supra note 83, at 830 (citing Learning Disabilities Association Paper 
on Full Inclusion of All Students with Learning Disabilities in the Regular Educational 
Classroom , LDA Newsbriefs (March/April 1993)). The Learning Disability Association of 
America took a stand against full inclusion and prefers several placement options. Id. Teacher’s 
unions are also skeptical of inclusion. The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) called for a 
moratorium on the inclusion of disabled children into the general educational environment 
because the AFT wants to learn more about how to make inclusion work. Id. A 1994 study by 
the AFT revealed that three out of four teachers would object to a full-inclusion model. Id. 
Also, with the fiscal problems facing numerous school districts, many teachers believe that 
disabled children will be mainstreamed into a general educational environment without the 
adequate support necessary to make it beneficial to them. Id. at 831. 
 94. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1051. 
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environment should be considered.95 This analysis, however, 
minimizes the basic purpose behind education in the classroom—
schools exist to educate. Placing a disabled child in a classroom 
merely to enhance that child’s social skills is contrary to this 
underlying purpose. 
Another disadvantage of mainstreaming is the effect on the 
children who are already placed in a general educational 
environment. The courts and the advocates of inclusion pay little 
attention to the needs of the “normal” child. Courts only address the 
effect on the other children in the classroom if the disabled child is so 
disruptive that the child renders it nearly impossible to conduct 
class.96 This threshold is too high. Courts should reconsider this 
threshold before concluding that inclusion is the most appropriate 
solution. 
In addition, courts and proponents of inclusion should consider 
the costs of mainstreaming disabled children into a general 
educational environment.97 Schools operate on limited budgets.98 
 
 95. See Boeckman, supra  note 11, at 873. 
 96. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049. 
 97. The Supreme Court has never addressed directly the issue of finance in regard to the 
IDEA. However, in Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, the Court said that Congress 
could not impose financial burdens on the schools unless it did so unambiguously. 458 U.S. 
176, 190 n.11 (1982). See also  Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 886 (1984). In 
Irving, the Court had to decide whether a school needed to provide a disabled student with a 
Clean Intermittent Catherization under the IDEA. Id. The Court looked to the definition of 
“medical services” provided in the IDEA regulations and determined that medical services 
included only those services provided by a licensed physician. Id. at 892. Thus, the Court ruled 
that “the Secretary could reasonably have concluded that it was designed to spare schools from 
an obligation to provide a service that well might prove unduly expensive and beyond the range 
of their competence.” Id. The circuits present no uniform approach to the cost issue. The First 
Circuit, in Doe v. Arig , determined that cost may be considered to determine whether a program 
for a disabled child is appropriate. 692 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1982). In Doe, the court concluded 
that a more costly program, where a child with Down’s syndrome remained in a residential 
placement instead of moving to a home environment, was more educationally appropriate. Id. at 
806. See also  Hurry v. Jones, 734 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1984); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 
223 (1st Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit also has considered the issue of cost. In Detsel v. Bd. of 
Educ., the court upheld a lower court’s decision that a school had to provide a disabled student 
with constant supervision by a nurse. 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987). The Third Circuit, in Battle 
v. Pennsylvania , explained that states cannot reject services for disabled children solely because 
they are costly. 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980). However, the state may consider the effect of the 
cost on resource allocation. Id. at 283. See also  Benn H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Pa. 
1987); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981); Kruelle v. New Castle 
County Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981). The Fourth Circuit, in Barnett, explained that 
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Instead of using the aids and special educational services that already 
exist, inclusion requires schools to provide new services to 
accommodate the needs of disabled children in general classrooms.99 
When schools spend their funding to accommodate the needs of 
disabled children, the other students suffer because of the school’s 
restricted ability to spend its resources on materials necessary for 
other students to thrive. Instead, schools spend money to supplement 
services and supplies they already possess. 
 
the term “appropriate” in free and appropriate public education “does not mean the best 
possible education that a school could provide if given access to unlimited funds.” 927 F.2d at 
154. See also  Tice v. Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1990); Burke County 
Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1990); Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. 
Va. 1981); Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Va. 1981). The Fifth Circuit, in 
Crawford v. Pittman, explained that when an agency seeks to limit the services to disabled 
children due to financial constraints, the agency must ensure that the limitations are imposed 
equally on children with and children without disabilities. 708 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir. 1983). 
See also  Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Stacey G. v. Pasadena Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 547 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1982). The Sixth Circuit, in Age v. Bullitt County Pub. 
Sch., reasoned that in order to comply with the purpose of the IDEA districts must mainstream 
disabled children with non-disabled children despite the associated possible burdens. 673 F.2d 
141 (6th Cir. 1982). See also  Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Macomb County Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Joshua S., 715 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The 
Seventh Circuit, in Darlene L. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., refused to place an emotionally 
disturbed child in a psychiatric hospital because of the financial burden. 568 F. Supp. 1340, 
1345 (N.D. Ill. 1983). See also  William S. v. Gill, 572 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The 
Eighth Circuit in A.W. v. Northwest R-1 Sch. Dist. explained that courts can weigh the cost to 
the school district and the benefit to the child when determining whether the IDEA’s 
mainstreaming requirement has been met. 813 F.2d at 163. The Ninth Circuit, in Dept. of Educ. 
v. Katherine D., rejected a home-bound program for a child who required a tracheotomy tube to 
help her breathe. 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983). The court explained that the schools need only 
make an effort to accommodate a disabled child and that effort simply must be within reason. 
Id. at 812. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, in Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, Fla., 
concluded that courts must consider the financial burden imposed on the school district when 
providing services to disabled children. 861 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir. 1988), on remand, 711 
F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Fla. 1989).  
 98. See Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost be a Factor 
in Special Education Cases?, 71 EDUC. LAW. REP. 11 (1992). State and local educational 
agencies largely fund the programs and services. Id. at 11. The federal government is authorized 
to fund up to 50% of the average cost of schools’ per pupil expenditures. However, this is not 
always the case. Id. The financial burden of providing programs and services to mainstream 
disabled children has led to a great deal of disputes involving the IDEA. Id. Additionally, IDEA 
entitlements to special educat ion services and programs have increased and thus litigation of 
this issue continues to be a problem.  
 99. See Collins & Zirkel, supra  note 98, at 11. The average cost of educating a disabled 
student is approximately two and one-half times greater than the average cost of educating a 
child without disabilities. Id. 
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IV. PROPOSAL 
Although the tests used by the circuits to analyze the question of 
inclusion vary, the circuits agree that mainstreaming is not 
appropriate in two situations. First, the courts will not mainstream a 
disabled child if the child will not receive any educational benefit 
from a general classroom.100 Second, the courts will decline to 
mainstream a disabled child if the disabled child disrupts the 
activities in the regular educational environment.101 While the courts 
have identified two situations where mainstreaming is not 
appropriate, they have not explained precisely how far they will be 
willing to extend these situations. The courts explain that the lack of 
an educational benefit will result in segregation of the disabled 
child.102 However, the courts fail to define exactly what constitutes an 
educational benefit. Furthermore, the courts explain that a disruptive 
disabled student is not suited for mainstreaming; still, the courts 
never attempt to explain how disruptive a disabled child must be 
before the child is sent to a special environment. In Oberti, the 
disabled student was extremely disruptive; however, the court 
attributed the student’s outbursts to a lack of appropriate services and 
concluded that an inclusive program with the necessary aids would be 
sufficient.103 Still, is it enough to warrant a separate educational 
environment if the disabled child is disruptive but not threatening? 
The courts fail to explain how to resolve these issues. 
As a result of the courts’ inability to set forth adequate guidelines 
to evaluate questions of inclusion, courts often favor inclusive 
placements even though integration may not always be appropriate. 
The courts explain that the socialization benefits of inclusion justify 
these placements.104 Thus, while the education of disabled children 
may not be furthered and a disruptive child may distract the rest of 
 
 100. Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1001; Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215; 
Greer, 950 F.2d at 697; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1047; Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. 
 101. Hartmann, 118 F.3d at 1004; Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404; Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217; 
Greer, 950 F.2d at 697; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049. 
 102. See, e.g., Daniel R.R., 874 at 1045-51. 
 103. McCarthy, supra  note 83, at 826-30. 
 104. See, e.g., Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217; Greer, 950 F.2d at 697; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 
1047-48. 
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the class, the courts stretch their imprecise but established terms and 
conditions to rationalize the decisions they make. It is evident, 
however, that the courts’ approach undermines the intent of the 
IDEA—to mainstream disabled children only when mainstreaming is 
appropriate. 
In order to remedy these apparent inconsistencies, several 
conditions set forth by the courts must be clarified. However, before 
addressing these conditions it is important to acknowledge the 
interpretations of the IDEA that should remain unchanged. First, the 
courts’ interpretation of the IDEA’s least restrictive environment 
mandate should be retained. The courts generally agree that this 
provision simply means that whenever feasible disabled children 
should be placed in environments that are least restrictive to their 
needs.105 Second, the courts recognize the necessity of the IEP for 
children with disabilities.106 The majority of courts agree that these 
programs should be established on a case-by-case basis and that the 
IEP should strive to provide the most suitable placement for the child 
in question.107 Finally, the courts consistently require disabled 
students to be mainstreamed to the “maximum extent possible.”108 
While the courts agree on the primary goals of the IDEA, they 
differ in their interpretations of when these goals have been achieved. 
Thus, new guidelines must be set. First, a disabled child should be 
removed from the general classroom if the educational benefits do 
not aid in academic advancement. Thus, approximately six months or 
one year after placement the child’s intellectual capacity should be 
evaluated to determine if progress has been made. If the child’s 
educational abilities are the same as when evaluated upon first 
entering the integrated environment, the school will remove the child 
from the general classroom for placement in an environment more 
closely tailored to meet the child’s needs. Second, the school should 
remove a disabled child from the general classroom for disruptive 
behavior if on more than one occasion the child’s outbursts cause the 
teacher to discontinue teaching, create an environment in which 
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concentration is impossible, or threaten harm to other students in the 
class. 
The removals are not considered permanent. The disabled child 
may be given the opportunity to return to the general classroom if the 
disabled student’s special education teacher feels that the student is 
ready to try again. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In inclusion cases, courts appear to have the disabled students’ 
best interest in mind. It obviously is desirable to rectify the history of 
segregation that disabled children have been forced to undergo 
simply because of their disabilities. However, when courts attempt to 
remedy past problems by integrating disabled children into the 
general educational environment whenever possible, new problems 
surface. Many disabled children do not progress in general education 
classrooms and their presence is detrimental to the other students’ 
education. The courts often justify these concerns with the loose 
guidelines they have set forth. However, instead of integrating a 
disabled child whenever possible, the courts should integrate only 
when integration is reasonable. This approach would benefit both 
disabled children and children without disabilities. Moreover, it 
would ensure that the focus of the classroom experience remains on 
education. 
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